美國補貼棉農爭端事件簿

WTO於2009年8月31日發布仲裁報告,授權巴西對美國進口物品提出貿易報復措施,報復金額總計2億9千470萬美元,並限制美國為扶持高地棉栽種者,所持有之智慧財產權及服務等農場支持相關措施。

  美國高地棉補貼案(United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, DS267),係2002年巴西控訴美國使用及出口高地棉補貼之措施,違反WTO之《補貼及平衡措施協定》(the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, SCM協定)的禁止性補貼、可控訴補貼及《農業協定》等。爭端解決機構(Dispute Settlement Body, DSB)於2005年3月21日通過小組與上訴機構裁決中對美國之建議,美國高地棉的出口信貸計畫及高地棉使用者行銷給付(Step 2),構成《SCM協定》下禁止性補貼,依據《SCM協定》第4.7條規定,應立即取消系爭措施。2005年7月履行期限屆至,巴西認為美國並未實踐DSB的建議,巴西依據爭端解決規則與程序瞭解書(Understanding on Rules and procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, DSU)第21.5條規定,向WTO請求成立爭端履行小組(compliance panel),小組於2006年10月25日成立。

  WTO仲裁小組在兩部分的裁決裡,同意巴西有權每年固定課徵總額1億4千730萬美元的貿易措施,該數額乃是考量美國補貼造成巴西棉業受到「嚴重損害」,以及每年因GSM-102(General Sales Manager 102 Program)出口信貸計畫圖利美國出口商品所造成之禁止性補貼數額。

  該仲裁報告使用的資料自2006年開始,該年反制措施的總量即達到2億9千4百萬美元,此一授權報復金額為WTO歷來第二高。

  仲裁報告對於巴西將制裁實施至服務與智慧財產權的範圍有所限制,小組認為除非反制措施在特定年度的總量,超過當年巴西由美國進口總額所計算出的起徵稅(threshold),巴西才能採取跨部門的反制措施。以2007年為例,起徵稅為4億970萬美元。

  根據最新資料初步計算,巴西估計,因應美國棉花計畫,2009年採取的反制措施將達8億美元。巴西預估可採取跨部門別報復的起徵稅,今年度將在4億6千萬美元左右;意指巴西將在服務與智慧財產權部分,採取近3億4千萬美元的報復措施。

  小組以2006年美國聯邦政府提供給高地棉生產者的各項補貼支付,如市場貸款給付、反週期給付及出口信貸等為依據,以複雜的數學公式與方法計算,做出裁決。2005年WTO上訴機構的裁決,認為此給付造成對巴西棉花出口商的嚴重損害,並壓抑國際價格。

  巴西原要求報復金額為25億美元,但美國主張美國方案對巴西的衝擊不會超過2,280萬美元。巴西貿易代表阿茲維多(Reberto Azevedo)談及如何實施制裁的起徵稅之設定,在未來3年,巴西對於貨物可以課徵4億6千萬美元價值的平衡稅,在服務與智慧財產權項目上課徵3億4千萬美元。美國貿易代表則表示,小組駁回巴西要求一項附加關於棉花Step 2支付計畫的一次性、共計3億5千萬美元的反制措施,該計畫已於2005年廢除。

  美國可透由爭端執行審查小組的裁決或藉由上訴,對該項裁決提出質疑。美國國內棉花委員會控訴,此裁決是以2005年全部的資料為依據,當時是美國棉業支持的高峰時期,且美國的世界市場占有率超越今日,但迄今,美國棉花之全球市占率已萎縮至12%。去(2008)年,巴西與印度的棉花產量增加20%,美國的棉花產量則下降45%。由於2005年通過的預算立法及2008農場法案造成美國棉花計劃的大幅下降,棉花栽種者現在獲得出口保證及短期信貸已較過去大幅減少。

【由劉亮亨綜合報導,取材自WTO News,2009年8月31日、Washington Trade Daily,2009年9月1日】

 

The so-called Brazil cotton case is a long-running WTO dispute settlement case (DS267) initiated
by Brazil—a major cotton export competitor—in 2002 against specific provisions of the U.S.
cotton program. In September 2004, a WTO dispute settlement panel found that certain U.S.
agricultural support payments and guarantees—including (1) payments to cotton producers under
the marketing loan and counter-cyclical programs, and (2) export credit guarantees under the
GSM-102 program—were inconsistent with WTO commitments. In 2005, the United States made
several changes to both its cotton and GSM-102 programs in an attempt to bring them into
compliance with WTO recommendations. However, Brazil argued that the U.S. response was
inadequate. A WTO compliance panel ruled against the United States in December 2007, and the
ruling was upheld on appeal in June 2008.
In August 2009, a WTO arbitration panel—assigned to determine the appropriate level of
retaliation—announced that Brazil’s trade countermeasures against U.S. goods and services could
include two components: (1) a fixed amount of $147.3 million for cotton payments, and (2) a
variable amount based on GSM-102 program spending. The arbitrators also ruled that Brazil
would be entitled to cross-retaliation if the overall retaliation amount exceeded a formula-based
variable annual threshold. Cross-retaliation involves countermeasures in sectors outside of the
trade in goods, most notably in the area of U.S. copyrights and patents.
Based on the arbitrators’ formulas, using 2008 data, Brazil announced in December 2009 that it
would impose trade retaliation against up to $829.3 million in U.S. goods, including $268.3
million in eligible cross-retaliatory countermeasures. In March 2010, Brazil released a list of 102
goods of U.S. origin that would be subject to import tariffs of up to 100%, followed by a
preliminary list of U.S. patents and intellectual property rights that it could restrict. Brazil
announced an April 6 deadline for imposing the tariffs, which led to intense negotiations between
Brazil and the United States to find a mutual agreement and avoid the trade retaliation.